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I. INTRODUCTION

Think about this: What would happen if the balmy Caribbean state of
Grenada hauled Canada before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
claiming that the similarity in the names Canada and Grenada caused
confusion in the eyes of the global public and a concomitant reduction in its
tourist trade? What if, in addition, Grenada sought interim relief barring
Canada from using its name (but helpfully proposing in its place more
distinctive, not to say descriptive, names like "The Deep Freeze" or "Frozen
Tundra")? Leaving aside the question ofjurisdiction, the answer, with respect
to the request for interim relief, is that the ICJ would not permit itself to
consider the merits of the underlying case, notwithstanding its evident
frivolity, in determining whether interim measures were warranted.
While some national jurisdictions, notably the United States, require that
the underlying substantive case meet some standard of probability of success
on the merits before interim or provisional measures will be issued, this has not
generally been required in international proceedings. The principal rationale
offered for excluding such a requirement in international disputes is that to do
otherwise would foster the appearance of prejudging the case. However, such
a concern, while valid, does not justify excluding any and all consideration of
the merits. In particular, one countervailing factor that should be borne in
mind is that interim measures are an exceptional remedy, which departs from
the normal rule that a claimant may not obtain relief until that claimant has
proved its case. Indeed, the granting of interim measures before the merits are
finally determined may well impose a burden on the party opposing the
application for interim relief that turns out in the end to be unjustified,
including where the opposing party ultimately prevails on the merits. This
Article proposes instead that in international disputes, an applicant for interim
relief should have to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success (but no
more) on the underlying merits. Such a requirement would prevent any
prejudice arising from the issuance of interim measures based on claims that
are wholly without merit, but would not, at the same time, require an
assessment as to whether the applicant was more likely than not to prevail on
its substantive claim. In fact, as discussed in more detail below, the recent
work of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation (Working Group)
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
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in preparing a new draft Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, supports such a requirement.'
This Article is structured as follows: Part II examines the relevant decisions
(or more accurately, the lack thereof) of international courts and tribunals on
requiring an applicant requesting interim relief to demonstrate some standard
of probability of success on the underlying merits. Part III explores domestic
United States law, specifically United States federal law, regarding such a
requirement, and contrasts the American position with that presently taken in
international disputes. Part IV advocates a different approach for international
disputes, namely that an international tribunal or court should consider the
merits in determining interim measures but only to the extent necessary to
determine if there is a reasonable possibility of success. Part IV further looks
to draft Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration as support for the position advanced. Part V concludes with the
hope that on the eventual adoption of draft Article 17, what is now at best a
trend supporting such a requirement will gain momentum and translate into a
rule in the context of international disputes.
II. INTERIM RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
The purpose of interim measures is to preserve the court's ability to render
a meaningful decision. More specifically, interim measures prevent a party
from incurring further damages before judgment. Thus, the court is in a
position to grant appropriate relief when it does render judgment after having
afforded the parties the procedural rights to which they are due.2 While the
standards applied for the issuance of interim measures in international
proceedings are not uniform, they typically include urgency, imminent or
irreparable harm, and maintenance of the status quo.3 In general, however,
' See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Arbitrationand Conciliationon the Work of
Its Forty-SecondSession,UNCITRAL, 38th Sess., paras. 11-69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/573 (2005).
2 Donald Francis Donovan, The Scope and Enforceability of Provisional Measures in
InternationalCommercialArbitration:A Survey of Jurisdictions,the Work of UNCITRAL and
Proposalsfor Moving Forward,in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT

CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 82, 82-83 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003).
3 See, e.g., CHIMSTOPHH. SCHREUER, THEICSIDCoNVENTIoN:ACOMMENTARY 751 (2001)
(noting that circumstances giving rise to a need for provisional measures in ICSID arbitrations
must normally indicate necessity and urgency); CHARLESN. BROWER & JASOND. BRUESCHKE,
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMs TRIBUNAL 218 (1998) (noting that "the [Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal] will require the party seeking interim protection to prove ...that there exists
a threat of irreparable harm to property or to a right capable of being protected by the
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international courts and tribunals do not require an applicant requesting interim
or provisional relief to demonstrate any standard of probability of success on
the underlying merits.4 In most cases, the relevant rules authorizing the
issuance of interim measures make no specific mention of any such requirement, but instead grant the court or tribunal broad discretion to issue such
measures. While this broad discretion would allow a court or tribunal to
impose such a requirement, this has not happened. For example, Article 26(1)
of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
which authorizes the Tribunal to "take any interim measures it deems
necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute,"5 has never been
applied by the Tribunal so as to impose a merits test. As one authoritative
commentator on Tribunal procedures has observed, "[tihere is... no general
requirement of likelihood of success, on the merits, as required under several
legal systems, including U.S. law." 6 Similarly, the respective rules governing
the issuance of interim relief in international arbitration under many major
arbitral institutions including the International Chamber of Commerce,7 the

Tribunal ...[and] that an urgent situation exists justifying interim measures being taken");
American Convention on Human Rights, openedfor signatureNov. 22, 1969, art. 63(2), 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 159 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (authorizing the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights to adopt provisional measures in "cases ofextreme gravity and urgency, and when
necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons"); United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, openedforsignatureDec. 10, 1982, art. 290(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 511 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (permitting the issuance of interim measures that
are considered "appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final
decision").
4 See Donovan, supranote 2, at 128 ("[llnternational courts and tribunals deciding disputes
between states have.., shied away from [a requirement that the applicant show a likelihood of
success on the merits].").
hb-an-United States Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Rules ofProcedure, art. 26(1) (1983), http://
www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf.
6 JACOMIJN J. VAN HOF, COMMENTARY OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: THE
APPLICATION BY THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 190 (1991).
7 See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art. 23, at 24

(2004), http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdLdocuments/rules-arb-english.pdf.
Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been
transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any
interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate. The Arbitral Tribunal
may make the granting of any such measure subject to appropriate security
being furnished by the requesting party. Any such measure shall take the
form of an order, giving reasons, or of an Award, as the Arbitral Tribunal
considers appropriate.
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London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 8 and the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)9 do not refer to such a
requirement. ' As a result, there are practically no published decisions
involving international disputes that refer to such a requirement, much less
discuss it at any length. Indeed, so keen is the desire to avoid any reference to
the merits in the determination of interim measures that courts have sideId.
8 Article 25(1) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules provides as follows:

The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties in writing, on the application of any party:
(a) to order any respondent party to a claim or counterclaim to provide
security for all or part of the amount in dispute, by way of deposit or
bank guarantee or in any other manner and upon such terms as the
Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate. Such terms may include the
provision by the claiming or counterclaiming party ofa cross-indemnity,
itself secured in such manner as the Arbitral Tribunal considers
appropriate, for any costs or losses incurred by such respondent in
providing security. The amount of any costs and losses payable under
such cross-indemnity may be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal in one
or more awards;
(b) to order the preservation, storage, sale or other disposal of any
property or thing under the control of any party and relating to the
subject matter of the arbitration; and
(c) to order on a provisional basis, subject to final determination in an
award, any relief which the Arbitral Tribunal would have power to grant
in an award, including a provisional order for the payment of money or
the disposition of property as between any parties.
London Court of International Arbitration, The LCIA Rules, art. 25(1), at 17-18 (n.d.), http://
www.lcia-arbitration.com/download/rules/pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
9 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between the States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 47, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159: "Except
as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require,
recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of
either party." 1d.; see also INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Rules of Procedure
for Arbitration Proceedings (ArbitrationRules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND
RULES, R. 39(1), at 117 (2003), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm: "At any
time during the proceeding a party may request that provisional measures for the preservation
of its fights be recommended by the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to be
preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the circumstances that
require such measures." Id.
10But cf Gregoire Marchac, Interim Measures in InternationalCommercial Arbitration
Under the ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 123, 129 (1999)
(noting, although without supporting citations, that the "[u]sual requirements [for granting
interim remedies in international commercial arbitration] include ... likelihood of success on
the merits").
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stepped the issue even when the parties have expressly raised it, as has
happened with the ICJ in the Case ConcerningPassage Through the Great
Belt (Great Belt)."
In Great Belt, Finland objected to Denmark's plans to construct a bridge
over the Great Belt, one of the Danish Straits, on grounds that the construction
as planned would prevent Finland from exercising its alleged right of free
passage through it. In particular, Finland contended that the passage of drill
ships and oil rigs manufactured in Finland would be obstructed as they were
taller than the clearance provided under the proposed bridge. 2 Finland applied
to the ICJ for a declaration that the construction was in fact incompatible with
its right of free passage, and also requested provisional measures to stop the
bridge construction works.' 3 Finland based its latter application on Article 41
of the ICJ Statute,14 which provides that the ICJ "shall have the power to
indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures
which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party."15
In opposing Finland's request for provisional measures, Denmark argued,
inter alia, "that for provisional measures to be granted it is essential that
Finland be able to substantiate the right it claims to a point where a reasonable
prospect of success in the main case exists, and that not even a prima facie case
exists in favour of the Finnish contention. " " In response, Finland argued that
the ICJ could not enter into the merits of a particular case when determining
the issuance of provisional measures. Without deciding whether or not such
a requirement exists, the ICJ addressed the parties' arguments as follows:
Whereas it is the purpose of provisional measures to preserve
"rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings";
whereas the Court notes that the existence of a right of Finland
of passage through the Great Belt is not challenged, the dispute
between the Parties being over the nature and extent of that right,
including its applicability to certain drill ships and oil rigs;
whereas such a disputed right may be protected by the indication

Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12 (Provisional

Measures Order July 29) [hereinafter GreatBelt].
12Id. at 13.

11Id. at
14 Id.

13-14.

"5Statute ofthe International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 41, 59 Stat. 1055, 1061.

16 GreatBelt, supra note 11, at 17.
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of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute if the
Court "considers that circumstances so require".... 7
Ultimately, the ICJ denied the request for provisional measures, although
it appeared in reaching this result to rely primarily on the fact that the bridge
would not be completed, and therefore would not present any physical
obstruction, until after the ICJ would foreseeably have givenjudgment on the
merits. 8
Plainly, the ICJ's pronouncement is less than satisfactory insofar as it
avoids grappling directly with the question of whether an applicant for
provisional relief must demonstrate a probability of success in the underlying
case. Indeed, Judge Shahabuddeen penned a separate and highly instructive
opinion in the case solely to highlight this issue.19 As he saw it, the problem
presented to the ICJ was as follows: "[I]s it open to the Court by provisional
measures to restrain a State from doing what it claims it has a legal right to
do ...

without having required the requesting State to show that there is at

least a possibility of the existence of the right for the preservation ofwhich the
measures are sought?"2 Answering the question in the negative, Judge
Shahabuddeen first noted the exceptional character of interim measures:
"Interim measures always constitute an exceptional remedy. They derogate
from the usual rule that a plaintiff can not obtain relief until he has thoroughly
proved his case, and all defenses and objections of his adversary have been
21
heard and considered.",
As Judge Shahabuddeen went on to observe, this factor has led a commentator to suggest that in considering what circumstances indicate a need for
interim measures, the ICJ should require "a prima facie showing of probable
right and probable injury. ' '22 Judge Shahabuddeen acknowledged that as
against this factor, the Court had to guard against the "appearance of prejudgment," which he described as "[p]ossibly the most influential factor contributing to a discernible and perhaps understandable general impression that the
Court should not consider whether there is a prima facie case as to the
17 Id. (citation

omitted).

IId. at 18.
19 Id. at 28 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).
20

id.

21 Id. at 29 (separate

opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen) (quoting EDWARD DUMBAuLD,

INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 184 (1932)).
22 Id. (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen) (quoting DUMBAULD, supra note 21, at
160-61).
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existence of the right claimed."23 He noted, however, that "that consideration
needs to be balanced against the reflection that the State which is sought to be
constrained may itself have an interest in showing that the requesting State has
failed to demonstrate a possibility of the existence of the right sought to be
protected .... ",24
Additionally, Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out that the ICJ's failure to
respond to this issue was at odds with its jurisprudence. Specifically, given
that the ICJ required an applicant for interim relief to prove that the Court has
prima facie jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, i.e., the merits, and that
jurisdiction over the merits is but one element that the applicant must establish
in order to succeed on the substantive case, there was no reason that the
applicant should be required to show a prima facie case in respect of only one
such element.2 5 Judge Shahabuddeen emphasized that what was called for was
not "proof of the definitive existence of the right claimed" but rather that
"enough material.., be presented to demonstrate the possibility of existence
of the right sought to be protected., 26 Judge Shahabuddeen's observation is
particularly pertinent as it is not only the ICJ that requires applicants for
interim relief to make out a prima facie case with respect to jurisdiction over
the merits, but also various other international courts and tribunals.27 It
therefore stands to reason that, at least with respect to such international courts
and tribunals, there should be a requirement that applicants for interim relief
demonstrate a possibility of success on the merits.

23 Id. (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen). Relevantly, the ICJ took care in the

penultimate paragraph of its decision, which immediately precedes the dispositif,to distance
itself from any such prejudgment: "Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no
way prejudges any question relating to the merits of the case, and leaves unaffected the rights
of the Governments of the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Denmark to submit
arguments in respect thereof .. " Id. at 20.
24 Id. at 29 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).
23 Id. at 30-31 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).
26 Id. at 31 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).
27 See Donovan, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that "international courts and tribunals...
consider[ ) the merits ... to the extent necessary for a finding of prima facie jurisdiction"); see,
e.g., Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 216, 220 (1985) ("One
requirement for the issuance of interim measures is that there be, at least prima facie, a basis on
which the jurisdiction ofthe [Iran-United States Claims] Tribunal might be founded."); see also
UNCLOS, supranote 3, art. 290(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 511 ("Ifa dispute has been duly submitted
to a court or tribunal which considers that prima facie it has jurisdiction... the court or tribunal
may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the
circumstances .... ).
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As Judge Shahabuddeen's opinion makes clear, in the broader inquiry there
is more in the balance than the consideration that a court or tribunal may be
seen as prejudging the case if it were to look to the underlying merits.2" In
particular, one should account for the fact that the exceptional nature of
interim remedies militates against their issuance in the ordinary case and that
the party opposing the application for interim relief has an interest in showing
that the underlying case is without merit, i.e., that there is not even a "possibility" that the applicant will prevail in the underlying case.2 9 After all, the
issuance of interim measures before the merits are finally determined may well
impose a burden on the party opposing the application that turns out in the end
to be unjustified, such as where such party ultimately prevails on the merits.3"
As the opinion also suggests, these opposing considerations are best resolved
by requiring that the applicant show a prima facie case with respect to the
underlying merits, or as proposed in this Article, that the applicant be required
to show a reasonable possibility of succeeding on the underlying merits.
III. INTERIM RELIEF UNDER UNITED STATES LAW

In contrast to international courts and tribunals, U.S. courts generally
require an applicant seeking interim relief (typically in the form of a preliminary injunction) to show some standard of probability of success on the merits.
While this is true both under state and federal law, 3' this Article will examine
only federal law as there is a fairly uniform and established body of law
thereunder regarding the issue.
Under federal law, "in considering a plaintiff's request for a preliminary
injunction a court must weigh four factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff would
suffer irreparable injury were an injunction not granted; (3) whether an
injunction would substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) whether

2" Great Belt, supra note 11, 1991 I.C.J. at 29 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).

'9 Id. at 30 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).
30 Id. at 29 (separate opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen).
31See Jason S. Wood, A Comparisonofthe EnforceabilityofCovenantsNot to Compete and
Recent EconomicHistories ofFourHigh Technology Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 14,24 (2000)

(noting that a plaintiff in many states must show inter aliathat "there is a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits" in order to obtain a preliminary injunction); 11 A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948

(2d ed. 1995) (noting that one of the most important factors in determining whether to grant or
deny a preliminary injunction is "the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits").
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the grant of an injunction would further the public interest., 32 No one factor
is necessarily determinative, rather, "[t]he court must balance these factors
against one another and against the extent of the relief sought. '33 However, the
factor regarding the degree of likelihood of success on the merits assumes
particular importance when the court determines in weighing the relative
hardships (i.e., factor (2) above) that one party or the other will be injured
whichever course is taken. In such a case, the court adopts a "sliding scale"
balancing approach such that an applicant will have to prove a higher
probability of success on the merits where there is a lower likelihood that an
applicant will be injured if the court fails to act and vice versa.34
The purpose of preliminary injunctions, similar to the purpose of interim
relief in international proceedings, is "to protect [the] plaintiff from irreparable
injury and to preserve the court's power to render a meaningful decision after
a trial on the merits."3 As with the issuance of interim relief in international
disputes, however, "judicial intervention before the merits have been finally
determined frequently imposes a burden on defendant that ultimately turns out
to have been unjustified. 36 The formulation and the exercise of balancing the
four factors described above are therefore designed to implement the policy of
granting preliminary injunctions only when the need to preserve the court's
power to decide the case effectively outweighs the risk of imposing an interim
restraint before the case is in fact decided.37 Given this convergence of
purpose and risk with respect to interim relief in both U.S. federal and
international proceedings, the question naturally arises: Why the difference
between the factors governing the issuance of interim relief in the two kinds
of proceedings? Specifically, why are applicants for interim relief in
international proceedings not required to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood
of success on the merits of the case"?
The answer lies partly in the way each forum regards the implications of
such a requirement. Unlike international courts and tribunals, U.S. federal

32 Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 31, § 2948 (noting that the formulation involving these
four grounds for granting or denying a preliminary injunction has become "popular in all kinds

of cases [involving preliminary injunctions]").
33Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enterprises, Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(quoting Sofamor Danek Group v. Depuy-Moteh, 74 F.3d 1216, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
14 See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 31, § 2948.3.
31Id. § 2947; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
36WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 31, § 2947.
37Id.
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courts do not seem overly concerned about giving rise to an appearance of
prejudgment when determining the likelihood of success on the merits.
Instead, they recognize that the very nature of the relief requested-that it
"often, perhaps typically, depend[s] on underlying premises as to the
substantive law defining legal rights" 38 -can frequently require a preliminary
estimate of the strength of a plaintiff's suit.39 In contrast, international courts
and tribunals are sensitive to the risk of appearing to prejudge a case, a concern
that is particularly justified when a sovereign State is party to the
proceedings.4" Additionally, in the case of international arbitration, because
arbitrators for the most part sit by appointment on the consent of the parties,
their perceived ability to decide disputes impartially is an aspect of their
professional reputation that they zealously guard.4' They may tend, therefore,
to be more sensitive to avoiding the appearance of prejudging any dispute.
Further, the increased wariness of international courts and tribunals against
appearing to have prejudged a case can perhaps be justified in light of the fact
that unlike in federal courts, where a party may appeal both any preliminary
injunction granted as well as the judgment,42 international proceedings do not
generally provide an opportunity to appeal the substantive decision, let alone
any interim relief granted. 3
In sum, inherent differences in the nature of international and U.S. federal
courts and proceedings explain and arguablyjustify their respective contrasting

38 Delaware

& Hudson Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1971),

cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
39 See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supranote 31, § 2948.3.
40 Great Belt, supra note 11, 1991 I.C.J. at 29 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen)
(explaining that the need to avoid the appearance of prejudgment "is clearly of special
importance in the sensitive field of litigation between States").
41 Josef Rohlik, Arbitration as a Model for Resolution of Health Care
Disputes Between
Health CareProfessionals andHealth Care Organizations,41 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 1005, 1012
(1997) (stating that "[s]ince arbitrators' appointments are dependent on the consent of all parties
to a dispute, such arbitrators depend on their reputation").
42 Preliminary injunctions maybe appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1992), while final
decisions of district courts may be appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1992).
43 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 60, 59 Stat.
1055, 1063 ("The judgment is final and without appeal."); Dev. & Res. Corp. v. Iran, 26 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 256,260 (1991)(noting that "the [Iran-United States Claims] Tribunal Rules
do not provide for any appeal or reconsideration of an Award"); William H. Knull & Noah D.
Rubins, Betting the Farm on InternationalArbitration:Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?,
11 AM. REv. INT'L AR. 531, 531 (2000) (" '[F]inality,' meaning principally the lack of appeal
on the merits of the dispute, has been counted among the advantages of [global] private dispute
resolution over court litigation.").
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attitudes toward the need to avoid the appearance of prejudging a case. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that interim remedies serve the same overall purposes
in both U.S. federal and international proceedings, a requirement that an
applicant prove a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case"
(or a similar standard calling for some degree of probability of success) is not
appropriate in the latter as the international court or tribunal will otherwise
have to determine expressly and in advance of a full briefing on the merits
whether the applicant is more likely than not to prevail on the merits, which
will substantially expose it to the risk of appearing to have prejudged the case.
IV. A PROPOSAL REQUIRING

A "REASONABLE POSSIBILITY" OF SUCCESS

While it may be the case that a requirement based on a substantial
probability of success on the merits is not tenable as a condition for the
issuance of interim relief in international proceedings, the present approach of
international courts and tribunals, which is to avoid any consideration of the
merits whatsoever, does not recommend itself either. Specifically, the current
approach fails properly to address the exceptional nature of interim relief and
the risk that any interim relief granted may turn out in the end to be unjustified.
To counter the imbalance described above, this Article proposes instead
that parties seeking interim relief in international proceedings be required to
demonstrate that they have a reasonable possibility (as distinct from a
"probability") of succeeding on the merits. The adoption of such a requirement would take account of the exceptional character of interim remedies by
preventing the granting of interim remedies based on evidently unmeritorious
claims." At the same time, in granting interim relief under this standard, an
international court or tribunal would not have to determine in fact that the
applicant was more likely than not to succeed on the merits, but merely that it
was at least reasonably possible for the applicant to do so.
Admittedly, an applicant who has a reasonable possibility of succeeding on
the merits may well not prevail in the end. However, even the adoption of a

44 Cf MATTI PELLONPAA & DAVID D. CARON, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES As
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED: SELECTED PROBLEMS INTHE LIGHT OF THE PRACTICE OF THE IRAN-

UNITED STATES CLAims TRiBUNAL 442 (1994) (stating that "[a] Ithough at the stage of interim
measures an arbitral tribunal should not be overly concerned with the merits of the case, a party
whose case is clearly without merit should not be granted a request for interim measures").
Additionally, the application of such a standard has the potential of discouraging, if not

preventing, the strategic use ofinterim remedies, for example, to delay the final resolution of the
claims or to obtain leverage in the hopes of exacting a settlement.

2005]

INTERIM MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

substantial probability of success standard will not ensure otherwise; indeed,
nothing short of requiring absolute certainty of success will guarantee that
result, a requirement which would of course simply swallow the substantive
case itself. Rather, the point of the inquiry is to locate a standard that reduces,
as far as possible, that risk but without placing the court or tribunal in the
position of having to determine whether a party is more likely than not to
succeed on the merits. Arguably, a standard based on a "reasonable possibility" of success on the merits does just that. In fact, there is support for this
approach in the recent work of the UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration
and Conciliation (Working Group), in preparing a new draft of Article 17 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which
sets out the circumstances under which interim measures are permitted."a
Specifically, as of this writing,46 draft Article 17(3)(b) provides that an
applicant must satisfy the arbitral tribunal that "[t]here is a reasonable
possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits."47 As
discussed below, the drafting history of draft Article 17, and subparagraph 3(b)
in particular, provides further support for the adoption of the proposed
standard.
In 1999, the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation (Working
Group) was tasked with revisiting the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law of
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law); more specifically, the
Working Group was to address the question of the enforceability of interim
measures of protection, a task which the Commission felt was overdue. 48 In
that process, the Working Group turned its attention to article 17 of the Model
Law, which provides in relevant part that "[u]nless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any party to
take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider

4 Currently, Article 17, "Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures," reads:
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the
request of a party, order any party to take such interim measure of protection
as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter
of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide
appropriate security in connection with such measure.
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 17 (1985) [hereinafter
Model Law], http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.
See infra note 57.
47 Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of Its Fortieth Session,
UINCITRAL, 37th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/547 (2004).
41 See Report of the Working Group on Arbitrationon the Work oflts Thirty-FourthSession,
UNCITRAL, 34th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/487 (2001).
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necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute."4' 9 The Working
Group noted that while the provision authorized the issuance of interim
measures, it did not address the criteria for such issuance.50 Because such
guidance would enhance the certainty and the acceptability ofthe power of the
arbitral tribunal to issue interim measures of protection, the Working Group
charged the Secretariat with the task of establishing the terms, conditions, and
circumstances in which an arbitral tribunal could or should issue interim
of protection, the result of which would be drafted as a new Article
measures
51

7.

As part ofhis research, the Secretariat distributed questionnaires to various
governments to ascertain information on the power of courts to order interim
measures in support of arbitration.2 Based on the results thereof, which found
in relevant part that "[m]any laws establish a number of prerequisites for the
issuance of interim measures by courts in support of arbitration," including "in
most jurisdictions, that there is a likelihood of the applicant succeeding on the
merits of the underlying case," 3 the Secretariat proposed the following draft
Article 17(2)(c) (since renumbered as 17(3)(b)):
The party requesting the interim measures should furnish proof
that ...

there is a likelihood of the applicant for the measure

succeeding on the merits of the underlying case.54
On consideration of this first draft, the Working Group felt that the phrase
"substantial possibility" was "preferable" to the term "likelihood" (although
without detailing the reasons for the preference), and thus revised the provision
to require instead that an applicant demonstrate a "substantial possibility" that
the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the dispute.55 Subsequently,
however, the Working Group determined after further discussion that to
require "a substantial possibility" on the merits could be misinterpreted as

49 Model Law, supra note 45, art. 17.
S0

Id. at 19.

Ild. at20.
s Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Preparationof Uniform Provisions on Interim

Measures of Protection,Note by the Secretariat,UNCITRAL, 36th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP. 119 (2002).
" Id. at 12.
14 id.

at 22.

Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of Its Thirty-Sixth Session,
UNCITRAL, 35th Sess., at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/508 (2002).
"
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requiring the tribunal to make a prejudgment on the merits of the case and it
was therefore proposed that the wording be revised to refer instead to a
"reasonable prospect" of success and to make clear that any determination of
the same did not prejudice the findings of the tribunal at a later stage. 6 The
result is that draft Article 17(3)(b), as of May 2005,"7 provides:
The party requesting the interim measure of protection shall
satisfy the arbitral tribunal that . . . [t]here is a reasonable
possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits,
provided that any determination on this possibility shall not
affect the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in making any
subsequent determination."
As can be seen, the drafting history of draft Article 17 highlights the
various concerns discussed in this Article regarding a tribunal's consideration
of the merits in the determination of interim relief. Significantly, the Working
Group was alert to the reluctance of tribunals to examine the merits in
determining interim relief for fear of appearing to have prejudged the case. At
the same time, by maintaining the consideration ofthe merits as a requirement
for interim relief, the Working Group effectively acknowledged the need for
a tribunal to be persuaded that there was some merit to the substantive claim.
Therefore, in moving away from the Secretariat's formulation of requiring the
applicant to show a "likelihood" of success, to a "substantial possibility" of
success, and finally to a "reasonable possibility" of success, the Working
Group appears to have settled on a standard that would require the tribunal to
conclude that it was a non-frivolous case, without determining that an

6 Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of lts Thirty-Seventh Session,
UNCITRAL, 36th Sess., at 13-14, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/523 (2002).
" The Working Group was scheduled to discuss paragraphs (1) through (6 bis) of draft
Article 17 at its forty-first session in Vienna, Austria, in September 2004, Report on the Working
Groupon ArbitrationandConciliationon the Work ofIts Forty-FirstSession, UNCITRAL, 38th
Sess., at 5-6, 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/569 (2004), but, because of a lack of time for discussion,
decided to examine those paragraphs at a future session. Id. at 20. The Working Group did not
discuss paragraphs (I) through (6 his) at its forty-second session in New York in January 2005,
see Report of the Working Group on Arbitrationand Conciliationon the Work of Its FortySecond Session, supranote 1,at 3-5, and it is unclear at this time when the group plans to return
to these provisions.
" Report of the Working Group on Arbitrationon the Work of Its Fortieth Session, supra
note 47, at 18.
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applicant was more likely than not to succeed on the merits." Although still
a work in progress, it is hoped that with its eventual adoption, draft Article 17
will influence international courts and tribunals to adopt such a standard.
V. CONCLUSION

Applicants for interim relief in international disputes should be required to
demonstrate a "reasonable possibility" of success on the merits. This standard
acknowledges the exceptional nature of interim remedies yet addresses the
concern on the part of courts and tribunals with avoiding the appearance of
prejudgment. If draft Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is finally
adopted in its current form, one can be more optimistic about the prospect that
international courts and tribunals will in turn adopt the proposed requirement,
giving that standard, dare I say it, a reasonable possibility of success.

"' See Donovan, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that in arriving at a prior draft of Article 17
requiring a "substantial possibility," the Working Group "looked for a formulation that would
require the tribunal to conclude that the case was a serious one, without having to decide whether
the applicant was more likely than not to succeed on the merits").

